I was born in Poonch (Kashmir) and now I live in Norway. I oppose war and violence and am a firm believer in the peaceful co-existence of all nations and peoples. In my academic work I have tried to espouse the cause of the weak and the oppressed in a world dominated by power politics, misleading propaganda and violations of basic human rights. I also believe that all conscious members of society have a moral duty to stand for and further the cause of peace and human rights throughout the world.
In exclusive
interviews, two Palestinians detained in separate Israeli prisons
recount harrowing details of violent sexual assault
Editor's note: The article contains graphic and distressing details of sexual abuse.
As Sami al-Sai was escorted to a clinic inside an Israeli prison, he
could hear screaming from nearby rooms. Prisoners were being tortured.
The Palestinian journalist had heard accounts of abuse in Israeli jails before his arrest in February 2024. But nothing, he said, prepared him for what followed.
After a brief medical examination, a doctor turned to the guards.
“'Everything is fine. Take him,' he said," al-Sai recalled.
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Al-Sai was
dragged into a separate room, where for nearly an hour he said he was
kicked, stamped on, insulted and raped with an object while blindfolded.
Israeli guards watched, laughed and, al-Sai believes, may have filmed the assault.
For more than a year, al-Sai told no one what had happened. Months after his release in June, he decided to speak out.
“It’s difficult to talk about,” he told Middle East Eye. “But staying silent is worse.”
Al-Sai said he felt compelled to tell the world what Palestinian
prisoners endure in Israeli jails, adding that the sexual assault he
suffered was far from an anomaly.
“What I suffered is a drop in the ocean compared with others,” he said.
“It is nothing compared to what I heard from fellow prisoners.”
Al-Sai is now speaking about his experiences as a prisoner on public
platforms and to local media in the West Bank. But his interview with
MEE is the first time he has spoken to international media on camera. MEE is publishing details of his story with his permission.
Another former prisoner, who described how soldiers used a dog to
rape him and other instances of violent sexual assault, also agreed to
speak on condition of anonymity.
MEE's reporting adds further weight to widespread serious concerns
about Israel's systematic mistreatment and use of sexual violence
against Palestinian prisoners.
Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir
pictured during a visit to a prison in footage shared by the ministry
(Telegram)
Earlier this year, a United Nations inquiry
accused Israel of using sexualised torture and rape as "a method of
war... to destabilize, dominate, oppress and destroy the Palestinian
people".
The Israeli human rights organisation B’Tselem has described
the Israeli prison system as a "network of torture camps" within which
prisoners were subjected to "repeated use of sexual violence"
including "gang sexual violence and assault committed by a group of
prison guards or soldiers".
Last year, Israel's Channel 12 published a leaked video which appeared to show Israeli soldiers sexually assaulting a Palestinian detainee.
In response to questions from MEE, the Israeli Prison Service said it
"categorically rejected" the allegations of abuse described by the
prisoners.
‘We want to kill you’
Al-Sai, 44, a father from Tulkarm, has worked for years as a
journalist in the occupied West Bank, reporting for Al Jazeera Mubasher
and the local broadcaster Al-Fajer TV.
On 23 February 2024, Israeli forces raided his home during an
intensive arrest campaign in the West Bank following the October 2023
war on Gaza. He was taken from his home and spent the next 16 months in
Israeli custody under administrative detention.
Under the controversial practice, detainees are held without charge
or trial based on secret evidence they are not permitted to see.
'The pain was overwhelming. But I still didn’t know what they were going to do. Why did they remove my trousers?'
- Sami al-Sai, Palestinian journalist and former prisoner
After an initial 19 days in military custody, al-Sai was transferred
to Megiddo Prison. Upon arrival, he said he was handcuffed and
blindfolded.
His first stop was the prison clinic. On the way, he could hear screams from other rooms.
“'Say long live the Israeli flag,'” he recalls hearing a guard,
speaking fluent Arabic, shout at a prisoner. “'We want to kill you. We
want to make you die.'
“At that moment, I knew I was entering a stage I had never
experienced before,” said al-Sai, who had been arrested by Israeli
forces three times before.
Inside the clinic, guards and medical staff accused him of being a
member of Hamas, repeatedly threatening him that they “fuck, fuck, fuck”
anyone associated with the group. He denied the accusation.
After an electrocardiogram and a brief examination, the doctor told the guards he was fit.
Al-Sai said he was blindfolded again and escorted by four to six
guards, including a woman, through a series of corridors. Doors opened
and closed. He was finally thrown to the ground.
At this point, al-Sai said, his trousers and underwear were pulled
down, and he was ordered onto his knees. The beating began, with the
guards striking him repeatedly on the head, back and legs.
“I felt close to death,” he said. “The pain was overwhelming. But I
still didn’t know what they were going to do. Why did they remove my
trousers?”
‘Reception party’
Moments later, he said, a solid object was forced into his rectum.
“I tried to resist. I clenched my body to stop it. That only made the pain worse. Eventually, I surrendered.”
The object was pushed deeper and twisted deliberately, he said. When
he began screaming, a guard squeezed his testicles and pulled his penis.
“I screamed so loudly I thought my voice would leave the prison walls,” he said.
“I wanted to die at that moment. I couldn’t take it. I reached a point where I couldn’t comprehend what was happening.”
Throughout the assault, guards laughed. One addressed him directly.
“You are a journalist,” the guard said, according to al-Sai.
“We will bring all the journalists and do this to them. We will bring your wife, your sisters, your mother, and your son.”
'I wanted to die at that moment. I couldn’t take it'
- Sami al-Sai, former Palestinian prisoner
At one point, he heard a guard say: “Bring me a carrot.” Another object was inserted.
Later, he learned from other detainees that vegetables, sticks and other objects were commonly used during such assaults.
A guard stood on his head with full body weight. Al-Sai feared his
skull would burst. He also heard one guard tell another to “stop
filming”, suggesting the assault may have been recorded.
“They said they were taking revenge for 7 October,” he said. “But I am not from Gaza. I am a journalist.”
The assault lasted about 25 minutes, he estimates. He was held in the room for nearly an hour.
Among prisoners, this assault is called “the reception party” - a
violent attack involving sexual violence that many detainees face upon
arrival at the prison.
Al-Sai did not initially tell other prisoners what had happened to him. Instead, he asked them about their experiences.
He was shocked by what he heard, particularly from detainees from Gaza.
“We had never heard of this level of brutality and sadism,” he said. “Not even in stories or in history.”
He said almost all of the abuse was carried out by Israel Prison
Service (IPS) guards. He heard accounts of prisoners raped directly by
guards and others sexually assaulted by dogs.
Raped by a dog
Halim Salem (not his real name), a Palestinian father from the West
Bank who was detained months after the war on Gaza was launched,
described to MEE how prison guards had used a dog to rape him.
It all started at 4am, as he was sleeping. Guards stormed the cell,
throwing stun grenades and ordering prisoners to the floor. Eleven men,
including Salem, were tied face down, he said.
“They treated us like carpets,” he told MEE. “They stepped on us.”
Why raping Palestinians is legitimate Israeli military practice
Salem was taken to the toilet - a known blind spot without cameras.
He was beaten, ordered to strip naked and forced to kneel with his head in the toilet bowl.
His hands were tied behind him and lifted painfully.
One guard kicked him in his genitals as another stood on his head.
“I lost sense of where I was from the beating,” he recalled.
Then, he said, a dog was brought in.
“The dog mounted me and raped me,” he said. “I felt the dog’s penis. I begged, screamed, tried to tense my body to stop it.”
When he screamed, the guards beat him for “disturbing the dog”, he said.
The assault lasted several minutes. Afterwards, Salem was thrown into
the yard in freezing temperatures, handcuffed for six hours, wearing
only underwear.
Ben Gvir visit
Salem said he had spent a year in Israeli custody.
Though he wasn't raped by the dog until a few days before his
release, he said he was subjected to violent torture from the very first
moment of his arrest.
“Every day was like a thousand deaths,” he said.
From the outset, Salem said he was beaten, insulted and
strip-searched. Guards inserted fingers into his anus under the pretext
of searching for contraband.
In jail, he and other prisoners faced what he called a system of slow
destruction: starvation, dehydration, medical neglect, extreme
temperatures, filth and constant provocation.
'I saw Ben Gvir with my own eyes. He was laughing and gesturing like a director'
- Halim Salem, former Palestinian prisoner
Hygiene was severely restricted. Prisoners were forbidden from
keeping containers to clean themselves after using the toilet. Tissues
were rationed to a single square per day.
Food was systematically inadequate. Salem estimated that his daily
rations, across all meals, amounted to no more than 700 grams.
“No salt. No sugar. No spices. No meat. No fruit,” he said.
Medical neglect compounded the damage. Vitamin deficiencies led to
unfamiliar illnesses, including nails falling off, spreading ulcers and
collapsed immune systems.
Overcrowding worsened conditions. A section designed for 120
prisoners held more than 220. If one prisoner contracted scabies, Salem
said, entire rooms were infected.
Without treatment, scabies lasted months, spreading to the nerves and causing loss of movement for some.
On 9 July 2024, Israel’s national security minister, Itamar Ben Gvir, visited Ofer Prison, where Salem was being held.
Four rooms were raided, including his, by dozens of guards, at the request of Ben Gvir.
The minister, who was accompanied by two children, gave directions to
the guards as they dragged prisoners into the yard and assaulted them
with batons, including Salem.
“I told them - in Hebrew - that I had a heart condition,” he said.
“They tied my hands behind me, lifted them, and two guards beat my chest
while I was kneeling.”
One guard shouted, “Hit him until he dies.”
“I saw Ben Gvir with my own eyes,” Salem said. “He was laughing, gesturing like a director."
Ben Gvir has made several similar visits to Israeli prisoner, often with a camera crew, where he oversaw abuse and taunted prisoners.
MEE has contacted Ben Gvir's office for comment.
The Israeli Prison Service told MEE that the allegations made by
prisoners in this article "were unknown to us and do not reflect the
conduct of the Prison Service".
It added that the IPS "operates in accordance with the law" and that the rights of detainees are upheld.
Commenting on al-Sai's case after he had spoken at a public event in
Ramallah earlier this week, Sara Qudah, the regional director of
the Committee to Protect Journalists, said: “The allegations of torture
and sexual abuse made by Palestinian journalist Sami al-Sai are deeply
alarming and tragically consistent with testimonies CPJ has received
from other journalists detained in Israeli prisons.
“CPJ unequivocally condemns these practices, which point to a
troubling and systemic pattern of abuse. These grave allegations demand
urgent, independent investigations, full transparency, and
accountability for all those responsible.”
Speaking out
For both men, recovery has been difficult. They leaned on faith to absorb the initial shock, but stayed silent for months.
After their release, they and their families struggled to readjust.
When Salem finally returned home, his children did not recognise him.
“One recognised me by my smile,” he said. “Another said: ‘That’s not my father.’”
Iron bars, electric shocks, dogs and cigarette burns: How Palestinians are tortured in Israeli detention
Al-Sai did not even know his wife had given birth to a daughter while
he was in custody. The adjustment was painful for both of them.
“Imagine this girl seeing a stranger come into her home,” he said. “Psychologically, it was very hard.”
Over time, they bonded. Now she runs to the door when he leaves. “We reached a good stage,” he said.
As he began to resettle, al-Sai decided to break his silence, first
speaking to local media about what happened to him. Fearing re-arrest,
his wife begged him to stop.
Fear of detention, social stigma and lingering trauma stop many former prisoners from speaking out, both men said.
“To this day, I relive it,” Salem said. “But we will not break.”
Since
October 2023, Israeli forces have detained more than 20,000
Palestinians across the West Bank and Gaza. Rights groups and former
detainees describe systematic and daily abuse, including beatings,
sexual violence, starvation and medical neglect.
Under these conditions, at least 110 prisoners
are known to have died in custody since October 2023, though the true
number is believed to be higher. About 9,300 Palestinians remain
detained.
Despite a ceasefire in Gaza, Palestinian rights groups say abuse inside prisons continues.
That is why al-Sai and Salem say they are speaking out.
“We are real people, with real names,” Salem said. “We are a living
testimony for the world to see. They [Israelis] must be held
accountable.”
Al-Sai agreed. “We have seen many lies from this occupation,” he
said. “So we must show the truth. For those who try to ignore our pain,
this is what it looks like.”
The Israeli PM is expected to make the case during a December 29 meeting at Mar-a-Lago
by Dave DeCamp, Antiwar. com, December 21, 2025 at 4:15 pm ET
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is expected to ask President Trump to support another US-Israeli war on Iran, according to an NBC News report from Saturday.
The report said that Netanyahu will stress Israel’s concern over Iran’s production of ballistic missiles and will present Trump with options for the US to join or assist Israel with an attack on Iran. Israeli officials are also warning that Iran is reconstituting its nuclear sites that were bombed by the US during the war in June, but that was not their immediate concern.
According to a report from Israel Hayom, Israeli officials are preparing an “intelligence dossier” on Iran to present to Trump. Netanyahu’s office has said the meeting will take place at Mar-a-Lago on December 29, though President Trump suggested last week that it wasn’t finalized, saying, “We haven’t set it up formally, but he’d like to see me.” Trita Parsi, Executive Vice President of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, has been warning that another war with Iran was likely since Israel didn’t achieve all of its goals during its previous attack on the country, pointing to the fact that Iran’s missile strikes forced Israel to agree to a ceasefire quickly.
“The June war resulted in mutual deterrence, a situation Iran can accept, but one that is intolerable for Netanyahu and his legacy. Ultimately, the conflict was neither a victory for Israel nor for Iran,” Parsi wrote in Responsible Statecraft on Sunday, responding to the NBC report.
“It is precisely this balance of terror that prompts Israel to seek a new round – Israel’s military doctrine does not allow for any of its regional foes to deter it or challenge its military dominance. Iran’s missile program currently does exactly that,” Parsi added. “And this is precisely why Trump must say no to Netanyahu. Because Israel’s objective is not security in the conventional sense, but rather absolute dominance.”
Earlier this month, Trump suggested the US could destroy Iran’s ballistic missiles when a reporter said Iran was “reconstituting” its missile program. “Well, they can try, but it’s going to take them a long time to come back,” Trump said.
“But if they do want to come back and they want to come back without a deal, then we’re going to obliterate that one too. We can knock out their missiles very quickly. We have great power. And we helped Israel a lot. We were shooting down the drones. We were doing a lot of things for Israel. We did a good job for Israel. But Israel did a good job, they fought, they all fought bravely,” the president added.
Tel
Aviv and Washington encouraged reports claiming a 'rift' between Trump
and Netanyahu, to keep Iran 'distracted' and under the impression that
the US was opposed to war
US
President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
jointly coordinated the June war against Iran months prior, while
organizing a deception campaign in the media aimed at presenting
Washington as opposed to Tel Aviv’s plans against Tehran, sources told
the Washington Poston 17 December.
According to the sources, Netanyahu met Trump in February and gave him four options for how an attack on Iran could happen.
“The
Israeli prime minister first showed Trump what the operation would look
like if Israel attacked alone. The second option was for Israel to take
the lead, with minimal US support. The third was full collaboration
between the two allies. The last option was for the US to take the
lead,” the report said.
“Months of stealthy, intensive strategic
planning commenced. Trump wanted to give nuclear diplomacy with Iran a
chance, but he continued intelligence-sharing and operational planning
with Israel,” it added. “The thinking was, if talks fail, we are ready
to go.”
Trump said one day before the war started that the US
could potentially strike Iran, but that he preferred a diplomatic
solution.
“He and Netanyahu maneuvered to keep the Iranians unprepared for what would happen next,” the sources went on to say.
Tel
Aviv leaked information that Netanyahu’s Strategic Affairs Minister,
Ron Dermer, and Mossad chief, David Barnea, would soon meet with US
envoy Steve Witkoff.
A round of US–Iran nuclear talks had been
scheduled for 15 June. However, Israel launched pre-emptive strikes on
military and nuclear facilities in Iran on 13 June, triggering the war.
“Israel
had decided to strike, as the US well knew. The planned diplomacy was a
ruse, and officials from both countries encouraged media reports
of a US–Israeli rift. All the reports that were written about Bibi not
being on the same page with Witkoff or Trump were not true. But it was
good that this was the general perception, it helped to move on with the
planning without many people noticing it,” the sources said.
After
Israel’s indiscriminate campaign began, Washington put forward an
unrealistic deal demanding that Tehran renounce support for Hezbollah
and Hamas, as well as replace key nuclear sites with facilities that do
not allow uranium enrichment, the report revealed for the first time.
“Shortly
after the US transmitted the proposal to Iran via Qatari diplomats,
Tehran rejected it, and Trump authorized US strikes,” one senior
diplomatic source told the Washington Post.
At least 1,000 people, including hundreds of civilians, were killed in Iran during the 12-day war.
Israel’s
assassinations of top nuclear scientists killed dozens of civilians,
including the teenage son of one scientist who was not at home at the
time of the strike.
Hebrew media had already confirmed in June that Trump pretended to be against an attack on Iran while secretly greenlighting Israel’s campaign.
Since the start of the war in Gaza, reports in US and western media have regularly attempted to frame Washington as “frustrated” with Israel’s actions, despite its blatant military support for Tel Aviv throughout the genocide.
Between
October 2023 and September 2025, at least 46 reports were published in
western media describing former US president Joe Biden and Trump as
being “frustrated” with Israel's actions.
In
an exclusive interview, Meshaal makes the case that Trump should
definitively end Israel’s multi-decade war of annihilation and open a
new era in U.S.-Palestine relations.
Drop
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your support.
Khaled Meshaal in Doha, Qatar, on August 10, 2014. Photo: KARIM JAAFAR/AFP via Getty Images.
DOHA,
QATAR—If President Donald Trump wants to achieve stability in the
Middle East, he should put an end to Israeli interference in U.S. policy
toward Palestine, senior Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal told Drop Site.
Instead, Meshaal said, the U.S. should enter into a genuine process of
direct negotiations with Hamas and other Palestinian political factions
aimed at establishing friendly, bilateral relations.
“Unfortunately,
one of the problems with the U.S. administration is that it prioritizes
Israel’s interests more than the United States’ own interests. Even
Trump’s people—MAGA—came to realize that Israel is a burden on them,
restricting and harming U.S. interests. I am simply calling on the
American people and the U.S. administration to judge based on America’s
interests, not Israel’s,” Meshaal said. “If they look at us even for a
moment in a fair and impartial way, they will see that the Palestinian
people are oppressed under occupation, and they have the right to
resist—unless America steps in and forces Israel to withdraw, in which
case we would thank America.” He added, “When the world fails to help
you, you have no choice but to resist the occupier until you force it to
withdraw.”
Meshaal,
who is currently the head of Hamas outside of Palestine, was a founding
member of the movement and is one of its most experienced and
internationally well-known leaders. In the decade before Hamas launched
in 1987, Meshaal was part of a group that created the architecture for
the formation of a new Islamic political liberation movement in
Palestine. That process crystallized in the formation of the Islamic
Resistance Movement, commonly known by its Arabic acronym HAMAS. After
the Israeli assassination of Hamas’s spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed
Yassin in 2004, Meshaal was widely recognized as the political leader of
the movement and he served as head of its political bureau from
1996-2017.
He reiterated that Hamas is prepared to enter into a
long-term ceasefire agreement with Israel, backed by a pledge that Hamas
would store its weapons and commit to end all military operations
targeting Israel. Meshaal also said that Hamas is ready to work closely
with the U.S. and the international community in creating a stable
security environment inside Gaza that will enable the reconstruction of
the enclave, prepare the ground for democratic elections, and create the
political conditions for negotiations addressing the future of a
Palestinian state.
“The pragmatic American mindset, and President
Trump’s genuine concern to achieve stability and prevent Gaza from
remaining a continual bleeding wound that worries the world and deeply
strikes the human conscience [can] create an opportunity for stability,”
Meshaal said. “Hamas provides this opportunity with real guarantees and
a record of commitment.”
Hamas remains a popular political actor
within Palestine and has served as the only governing authority in Gaza
for two decades—a fact that, Meshaal said, Trump needs to consider.
While Hamas has offered to relinquish its governance of the enclave in
favor of a technocratic committee of non-partisan Palestinians, Meshaal
warned that attempting to impose a sweeping ban on anyone affiliated
with Hamas from participating in the stabilization and rebuilding of
society in Gaza would be counterproductive.
“Any attempt to
establish a non-Palestinian authority inside Gaza is first unacceptable
and second doomed to fail,” Meshaal said. “Any non-Palestinian
authority—meaning foreign authorities or foreign forces inside
Gaza—would be treated by Palestinians as an occupying authority, as an
occupying power. This would automatically create a state of conflict
because Palestinians would not accept it. Why would Palestinians reject
Israeli occupation but accept another form of foreign occupation?”
During
the sit-down interview with Drop Site in Doha last week, Meshaal argued
that the current moment offers an opportunity for the U.S. and Europe
to realign the Western approach to the Middle East. “The Palestinian
people are not against American interests. We are opposed to those who
interfere in our affairs and to those who support our enemy. But we are
ready to open up to America, to Europe, and to the world,” he said.
“What we will not accept is occupation, guardianship, or support for an
occupier. We criticize the United States not because it is the United
States—no—but because it provides Israel, our occupier, with complete
support in all forms. Today, there is an opportunity for transformation,
and I believe it is in the interest of the West to sponsor a
fundamental change in [the approach to] Palestine, just as it eventually
recognized the truth in South Africa and withdrew its support from that
apartheid regime.”
Citing Trump’s embrace of Ahmed Al-Sharaa, the
former Al Qaeda operative turned anti-Assad rebel leader who took power
as interim president of Syria in January, Meshaal said the U.S. should
pursue a similar path with Palestinian political leaders. “Why does the
U.S. administration give Ahmad Al‑Sharaa this opportunity but does not
give it to Hamas and the Palestinian resistance forces? It does not even
give it today to [Palestinian Authority President] Mahmoud Abbas, who
is not accused of terrorism,” Meshaal said. “It is in the interest of
the United States and Western capitals to pursue positive engagement
with Hamas and with the Palestinian people, because we are the future,
and this occupation will become part of the past.”
A former
physics teacher, the 69-year old Meshaal has spent his life building
Hamas. In 1997, a year after Meshaal was named head of Hamas’s political
bureau, the newly-elected Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
ordered Mossad agents to assassinate him in Amman, Jordan. Posing as
Canadian tourists, the two operatives sprayed poison into his ear as he
exited his car. One of Meshaal’s bodyguards, with the assistance of
Jordanian police, captured the Israeli agents. King Hussein subsequently
threatened to put the spies on trial and potentially execute them if
Meshaal died and to end Jordan’s peace treaty with Israel. In response,
Netanyahu dispatched the head of Mossad, Danny Yatom, to fly to Amman
with the antidote to the poison. Hussein also secured the release of
Yassin, Hamas’s spiritual leader, as part of the deal.
Sheikh
Ahmed Yassin, center, the spiritual leader of Hamas, with Khaled
Meshaal, right, and Mousa Abu Marzouk in Amman, Jordan, in 1997. (Photo
by KHALIL MAZRAAWI/AFP via Getty Images)
Meshaal
has been widely credited with being one of the architects of Hamas’s
2006 winning campaign in the Palestinian national elections. In 2012,
Meshaal—who had spent his life in exile since 1967—made a triumphant
visit to Palestine where he received a hero’s welcome in the streets of
Gaza. Meshaal’s last act as Hamas’s political leader came on May 1, 2017
when he presided over the public unveiling of a 42-point manifesto that
stated that Hamas was willing to accept a Palestinian state along the
borders that existed prior to the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.
“Without
compromising its rejection of the Zionist entity and without
relinquishing any Palestinian rights,” it stated, “Hamas considers the
establishment of a fully sovereign and independent Palestinian state,
with Jerusalem as its capital along the lines of the 4th of June 1967,
with the return of the refugees and the displaced to their homes from
which they were expelled, to be a formula of national consensus.” The
document also sharpened language defining the national liberation
character of armed struggle in Palestine, denounced anti-semitism and
clarified that the enemy of the Palestinian cause was a “colonial
Zionist project.”
While the manifesto did not officially replace
Hamas’s 1988 charter, its language on accepting what would amount to a
two-state solution was seen as a significant overture to the
international community. In the ensuing years, Meshaal continued to
represent Hamas internationally, but the center of leadership within the
movement shifted to Yahya Sinwar and Ismail Haniyeh—both of whom Israel
assassinated in the summer of 2024. Over the course of the past two
years of the Gaza genocide, Meshaal receded from prominence and has
seldom spoken or appeared in public.
That dynamic has changed as of late. Within minutes of Israel’s attack on Hamas’s offices in Doha on September 9,
Israeli media outlets and prominent social media accounts were
circulating reports that Meshaal and other Palestinian leaders had been
assassinated. Those rumors were false. While the strike killed the son
of Hamas leader Khalil al-Hayya, and four other office staff, it did not
kill any negotiators or political officials.
And now, in
the aftermath of Trump’s October Gaza deal, Meshaal has reemerged as a
prominent voice representing Hamas and outlining its positions on a
range of issues. He has denounced Israel’s pervasive violations of the
“ceasefire” agreement and its continued killing of not just Palestinian
civilians, but also members of the armed resistance who are direct
parties to the ceasefire. Since October 10, Israel has killed nearly 400
Palestinians and wounded more than 1,000 and continues to block the
agreed upon delivery of life essentials.
“Some in the world think
the first phase was excellent or fully implemented—it was not. While
the war, in terms of total annihilation, has stopped, Israeli violations
continue,” Meshaal said. “Therefore, our call as Palestinians, not just
Hamas, is that Israel must be held accountable for all agreements of
the first phase before moving quickly to the second phase. As Hamas
committed to the first phase requirements, Hamas, along with all
Palestinian forces, is committed to the requirements of the second phase
through this serious dialogue with the mediators to reach sound
approaches—not as Netanyahu wants, but as agreed upon with the
mediators.”
Meshaal has also outlined Hamas’s position that while
it is open to a “freezing” or storing of its defensive weapons, it will
not agree to disarmament unless it is in the context of establishing a
Palestinian army or security force capable of defending itself from
Israeli aggression.
Last week, Netanyahu mentioned Meshaal by name
in a speech, saying that Meshaal’s rejection of Palestinian disarmament
would be confronted. “This mission will be completed either the easy
way or the hard way,” Netanyahu said on December 9. A day later, Meshaal
sat for an hourlong special interview on Al Jazeera Arabic and Hamas
widely distributed his remarks across its official platforms.
Meshaal is the second most popular hypothetical candidate for president of Palestine, according to a recent poll,
should the Palestinian Authority allow fair elections. Marwan
Barghouti, who has ranked as the most popular potential leader for
years, is currently imprisoned on multiple life terms in Israeli prison.
“We hope that Marwan will be released, that he will have the
opportunity to engage in national struggle and political work, and that
he will be a candidate—this is his natural right,” Meshaal said. “Hamas
also has the right to nominate whomever it chooses, whether Khaled
Meshaal or someone else.”
Abbas, the 90-year-old head of the Palestinian Authority, disagrees. He issued a “decree law” on November 19 that would ban
Hamas-affiliated candidates and other pro-resistance Palestinians from
running in local elections. It would also prohibit candidates who do not
officially recognize the Oslo agreements and other deals that are
widely seen among Palestinians as dangerous capitulations. The law,
which was pushed by Western countries but widely denounced in Palestine,
is almost certain to be applied on a national level, according to a
source who has seen a draft version of the proposed decree. The source
added that there is language in the draft that would also prohibit any
party with an armed wing from participating in elections.
“The
democracy desired in Palestine, as is unfortunately practiced in some
countries in the region and the world, is that elections should produce
predetermined results acceptable to those holding them. If they do not,
they are canceled. That is not democracy,” said Meshaal. “If you respect
the will of the people, allow them to express it freely at the ballot
box. Today, everyone knows—even after the destruction in Gaza following
two long years of the crime of genocide committed by Israel—that the
Palestinian conscience, awareness, and, I believe, the Palestinian
voter, if given the opportunity, would vote for the resistance.”
Hamas’s Message to Trump: “Power is responsibility”
Drop
Site News met with Meshaal in person on Thursday in Doha. The interview
was conducted as the Trump administration is pushing forward with its
plan to deploy an International Stabilization Force (ISF) to Gaza and,
in recent days, has been intensifying its pressure on both European and
Islamic nations to commit troops. Several Arab and other Muslim
countries have said they will not join a mission to disarm or battle
Palestinian resistance fighters.
“We should be realistic and
nuanced in expecting certain things,” said Turkish Foreign Minister
Hakan Fidan in an appearance on December 6 at the Doha Forum in Qatar.
“Our first objective in deploying the ISF is to separate Palestinians
from the Israelis.” His remarks were echoed by Egypt’s foreign minister
Badr Abdelatty. “We need to deploy this force as soon as possible on the
ground because one party, which is Israel, is every day violating the
ceasefire and claiming that the other side is violating, so we need
monitors,” Abdelatty said.
Netanyahu has dismissed the notion that
an international force would be willing, or able, to implement a
disarmament operation. He suggested that Israel may eventually launch
its own military campaign in the name of disarming Gaza, an objective
its forces failed to achieve during more than two years of scorched
earth war.
Despite clear opposition from its Arab and Muslim
allies, the Trump administration continues to insist the ISF will enter
Gaza with a mission to disarm Hamas. “We specifically put language in
there that said, ‘by all means necessary,’” U.S. Ambassador to the UN
Mike Waltz told Israel’s Channel 12 on December 11, referring to the UN
Security Council resolution passed on November 17. “Now, obviously
that’ll be a conversation with each country. Those rules of engagement
are ongoing. I’ll tell you this, President Trump has repeatedly said
Hamas will disarm one way or another, the easy way or the hard way.”
Last
week, U.S. officials met with their European counterparts in Tel Aviv
to discuss the ISF and reportedly threatened to permit an indefinite
Israeli military presence if EU nations did not offer troops. “The
message was: ‘If you are not ready to go to Gaza, don’t complain that
the IDF stays,’” one European diplomat told Axios.
While
citing substantial objections over the Trump Gaza plan’s vague yet
sweeping nature, Meshaal said that the 20-point document nonetheless
contains key concepts that Hamas, in principle, would accept. Meshaal
cautioned, however, that the common ground between Hamas and Trump is
undermined by attempts to impose foreign rule over Gaza, deploy an
international force to disarm the Palestinian resistance, rather than
serve as peacekeepers, or to enact policies that would enable Israel to
continue its war of annihilation under the guise of a “peace deal.”
He
also reiterated that Palestinian negotiators never agreed to
disarmament or any of the terms in the “second phase” of a deal, despite
U.S. and Israeli claims to the contrary. The negotiators from Hamas
made clear privately and publicly in October that they only had a
mandate to negotiate a ceasefire and exchange of captives and that all
other issues must be handled through a consensus process involving all
major Palestinian political factions.
Hamas negotiators had urged
the U.S. and regional mediators to approach the issue of disarmament
through technical negotiation, Meshaal said, and not through edicts that
seek to achieve a surrender of the Palestinian liberation cause that
Israel could not win on the battlefield. During the October
negotiations, he noted, Hamas leaders informed the mediators that
sweeping demands for immediate disarmament would sabotage a broader
agreement and undermine Trump’s stated aim of ending the war.
“We
do not want to clash with anyone or confront anyone, but we will not
accept being forcibly disarmed. We told them: if you want results, let
us look for a realistic approach that includes guarantees,” Meshaal
said. “In truth, the major question is not the likelihood of the
Palestinian side’s commitment, the problem lies with the Israeli
side—because by its nature it is treacherous, this is its history.
Second, it is the side that possesses lethal weaponry. The issue is not
how to protect the Israeli side—it is the occupier. The issue is how to
protect the Palestinian people, who are nearly defenseless. The weapons
of the resistance do not mean that we are armed in the conventional
sense, as states are. We are a nearly defenseless people, and we have
sought weapons only to the extent possible in order to protect ourselves
and defend ourselves.”
In launching his sweeping plan for Gaza,
Trump was able to marshal the endorsement of dozens of Arab and Islamic
countries, culminating in an unprecedented UN Security Council
resolution that placed a fabricated stamp of legitimacy on an agenda
that many Palestinians see as doing Israel’s bidding and colonialist in
nature.
When asked whether the actions of Arab and Islamic states
represented a betrayal of the Palestinian cause, Meshaal struck a
diplomatic tone. “While they try to play a role in supporting the
Palestinian people, standing by its cause or stopping the war, they also
[consider] economic interests, arms purchases and other strategic
considerations,” he said. “Since the American president is, in fact, a
businessman, some countries are trying to build relationships with him
that either serve their interests or protect them from potential harm,
because they fear Trump’s adventures and sudden moves, as we saw in the
past. This situation undoubtedly weakens strong Arab and Islamic
intervention to stop the war.”
Despite the justifiable anger
Palestinians may harbor toward Arab and Islamic states for their lack of
intervention against Israel’s genocide, Meshaal emphasized, it is the
U.S. that holds the only leverage over Israel: “Yes, more is required
from Arabs and Muslims, but they are not the strongest party. As you
know, no one in the world is able to compel Israel—even Europeans do not
do so, or cannot do so.”
“Therefore, the responsibility of the
United States is a doubled responsibility, and power is responsibility,”
Meshaal said. “President Trump and the American administration alone
are capable of compelling Israel and Netanyahu to respect the
agreements, so they bear this responsibility before we assign
responsibility to any regional or international party.”
Below
is the full transcript of Drop Site’s wide-ranging interview with
Meshaal on December 11, 2025 in Doha, Qatar. The interview was conducted
in Arabic and translated into English by Drop Site.
Drop Site’s Jeremy Scahill interviews senior Hamas official Khaled Meshaal in Doha, Qatar on December 11, 2025.
Interview With Khaled Meshaal
Jeremy Scahill: Thank you for taking the time to speak with us.
Khaled Meshaal: Thank
you very much. I appreciate your keenness to conduct this interview and
for providing this space and platform for me and for all those who
represent the Palestinian cause.
There is no doubt that the
unprecedented Israeli crime is a war of genocide, a repetition of what
the Jews were subjected to many decades ago. They are now committing
this Holocaust and this war of genocide against the Palestinian people
and against a small area of only 365 square kilometers—using the most
severe and horrific tools of destruction and killing. We are pleased to
address Western public opinion through your platform so that people hear
from us, not about us, and so that the true nature of this conflict is
understood, about which the world has been misled for many decades. So
thank you.
Jeremy Scahill: Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu mentioned you by name the other day in regards to the
demands for the disarmament of the Palestinian resistance. Trump’s
National Security adviser, Mike Waltz, said recently that Hamas can
disarm the easy way or the hard way. Can you explain in detail the
position right now of the Palestinian resistance on the issue of
disarmament, freezing weapons, and a long term truce, or hudna? Explain the position, right now, in the face of these demands from Netanyahu and Trump’s administration.
Khaled Meshaal: Of
course, Netanyahu mentioned my name as if in a context of surprise, or
incitement—he is inciting. Does Netanyahu really expect the Palestinian
people to simply go and give up their weapons? Netanyahu’s own history,
and that of his predecessors among Israeli leaders, is full of
massacres. There is no trust among the Palestinian people toward the
Israelis and the occupation. Israel’s history is one of massacres,
treachery, and the violation of all agreements.
Even Yasser
Arafat, who signed the Oslo Accords with them, was killed by poison.
Mahmoud Abbas, who dealt with them with great openness in continuing
Oslo and the peace process, is now left in the headquarters in Ramallah
with no real role. In fact, Netanyahu, [Bezalel] Smotrich, and [Itamar]
Ben-Gvir are now disassembling the Palestinian Authority and withholding
its clearance funds. Not to mention the massacres Israel has committed
throughout its history in Palestine, Lebanon, and Egypt, and even in
relatively recent Palestinian history—when the Palestinian resistance
left Beirut, [Ariel] Sharon carried out the Sabra and Shatila massacres.
Therefore,
within Palestinian culture, both historically and in the present, there
is no trust in the Israeli. This is a criminal, treacherous enemy, and
therefore it is only natural for the Palestinian to hold on to his
weapon. This is not an extra weapon or something marginal for
Palestinians—it is directly tied to our existence under occupation. Any
people living in an independent state rely on the state and its army—the
state is theirs, the army is theirs, and it protects them. And in any
society, a citizen engages with their state through political means. But
when you are under occupation, resistance is natural. Who has not
resisted?
Let me tell you a story. In 2007, President [Jimmy]
Carter visited me. I respected him because he conducted himself with
high moral standards. He wrote books supportive of the Palestinian
cause. I valued him, and he gifted me some of his signed books. I
remained in contact with him. I was saddened when he passed away. This
man, with his deep humanity, asked me about my parents—who were living
in Damascus at the time in 2007. He asked, “Do you mind if I meet them?”
I said no, so he met with them. My father, spontaneously, said to him:
“Mr. Carter, listen—I fought the British Mandate. I fought the British.”
President Carter replied, with a beautiful spontaneity: “And we fought
the British too.”
Meaning that even the Americans fought the
colonizer or forms of colonialism and guardianship over the United
States. I am not speaking [only] about Vietnam, South Africa, the
peoples of the world, or Cuba—I am speaking even about Western
societies. You know that from the BBC in London, the British authorities
allowed [Charles] de Gaulle to ignite the spark of popular resistance
by the French people against the Nazis—against Hitler’s forces. So this
is [part of] culture—it is something natural. Accordingly, what
Palestinians do in resistance is natural, and their holding on to their
weapons is natural. It is essential that this background be clear to
everyone.
Former
U.S. President Jimmy Carter, right, embraces Meshaal upon their arrival
in Damascus for a meeting on October 19, 2010. Photo: AFP PHOTO/LOUAI
BESHARA via Getty Images.
When Trump’s
plan emerged, followed by the Security Council resolution, and dialogue
began between us and the Egyptian, Qatari, and Turkish mediators, the
central matter became, how do we deal with what was stated in the plan
and in the Security Council resolution? Our position was clear: Do not
resort to an approach of disarmament. This would lead to clashing,
violence, and confrontation from the side seeking to impose it on us. We
do not want to clash with anyone or confront anyone, but we will not
accept being forcibly disarmed. We told them, if you want results, let
us look for a realistic approach that includes guarantees. We outlined
several such guarantees. The first guarantee is that these weapons—Hamas
and the resistance forces would preserve and not use, display or parade
them. [The weapons] would be set aside by their own decision and with
full seriousness, especially given that Hamas has a record of commitment
and high credibility.
Second, what has been referred to as
international stabilization forces: we accept them on the borders as
separation forces between the Palestinian side and the Israeli side, not
as forces deployed inside Gaza, as was intended for them and as
Netanyahu wants—for them to clash with Palestinians and disarm them.
Third, we proposed a hudna, and this is evidence of Hamas’s seriousness
and the seriousness of the Palestinian resistance. A truce of five
years, seven years, ten years—whatever is agreed upon. And a hudna means
commitment. All the periods of calm, as we call them, during the wars
of the past twenty years—all those limited hudnas—Hamas adhered to them,
and it was Israel that violated them. So, a hudna.
We
do not want to clash with anyone or confront anyone, but we will not
accept being forcibly disarmed. We told them, if you want results, let
us look for a realistic approach that includes guarantees.
Fourth,
we said that the three mediators, along with other Arab and Islamic
countries that have good relations with Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the
resistance forces, can guarantee the Palestinian side to both the
Israeli and the American sides—that Hamas and the resistance are
committed. In truth, the major question is not the likelihood of the
Palestinian side’s commitment, the problem lies with the Israeli
side—because by its nature it is treacherous, this is its history.
Second, it is the side that possesses lethal weaponry. The issue is not
how to protect the Israeli side—it is the occupier. The issue is how to
protect the Palestinian people, who are nearly defenseless. The weapons
of the resistance do not mean that we are armed in the conventional
sense, as states are. We are a nearly defenseless people, and we have
sought weapons only to the extent possible in order to protect ourselves
and defend ourselves.
I believe these are the correct approaches.
I believe—as I stated in my [Al Jazeera] interview—that the pragmatic
American mindset, and President Trump’s genuine concern to achieve
stability and prevent Gaza from remaining a continual bleeding wound
that worries the world and deeply strikes the human conscience—Western
capitals, above all others, have become exasperated and fed up with what
Israel is doing—create an opportunity for stability. Hamas provides
this opportunity with real guarantees and a record of commitment. This
is the approach—any other [approach] is impractical. It is enough for me
to say it is impractical—not just unacceptable from our side.
Jeremy Scahill: I
watched your recent interview with Al Jazeera Arabic and you mentioned
the experience of Paul Bremer, who George W. Bush installed as the
“viceroy” in Iraq during the 2003 invasion. And when the Americans
implemented de-Ba’athification—where they criminalized the Ba’ath party
of Saddam Hussein—they eliminated huge numbers of not only the
professional military, but also civil society, government bureaucrats,
and technocrats. They broke civil society because of de-Ba’athification.
It seems to me that the Americans may eventually realize that Hamas is
not only a resistance movement, but was a government and built civil
infrastructure and civilian security forces. If they recreate a
de-Ba’athification policy with Hamas and they try to remove anyone
affiliated with Hamas, what would the consequences be on a security
level? Because the idea is they’re going to send in a Palestinian police
force—trained by the Egyptians, maybe. But the reality is that Hamas
has been the security internally in Gaza for two decades. What would the
consequences be if the Americans tried to adopt a de-Ba’athification
approach to Hamas in Gaza?
Khaled Meshaal: From
what I’ve been following in American statements, after the 2003 Iraq
invasion, there have been some American reassessments about what they
did in Iraq—that one of the mistakes was not just dismantling the
regime. They realized that by dismantling the Iraqi state and its
institutions, including the Iraqi army, they created chaos. This allowed
groups like ISIS and forces the U.S. feared to emerge and it provided a
pretext for prolonging the war in Iraq and the region. Therefore, I
believe the American administration under President Trump should not
repeat the same mistake—this is a relatively recent experience. If
America seeks stability in the region, it must not make things worse or
add fuel to the fire, which would further cause instability.
Furthermore,
Hamas is not just a military organization or armed group—it is a
resistance movement with a military dimension, but it is also a civil
society movement. It is deeply rooted in the Palestinian people and is
part of the fabric of Palestinian society. Its members are present
across all aspects of Palestinian life. For two decades, Hamas has
governed society efficiently, learning from past mistakes and gaining
experience, and there was stability. The people of Gaza know that before
Hamas ruled Gaza, there was lawlessness—a certain degree of chaos from
rogue groups. Hamas managed this situation with high efficiency.
Therefore, Hamas has a successful track record in maintaining security
in the country and providing public safety. It has a successful
experience in governing society, the government and providing for
people’s needs, despite an unjust siege that lasted throughout this
period.
Consequently, any attempt—and here I’m speaking about the
principle, not just the method—to establish a non-Palestinian authority
inside Gaza is first unacceptable and second doomed to fail. That’s why I
said the Bremer experience is not acceptable. Looking back at
Palestinian history a hundred years ago, after World War I in the early
1920s, there was the British Mandate. Practically, this Mandate was
colonial, and Palestinian revolts in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s fought
against it. The Mandate was unjust: it seized rights it did not possess,
and it served as cover for the Zionist gangs that infiltrated Palestine
and established Israel in 1948. Therefore, from a practical
perspective, the Mandate experience and legacy is extremely negative,
and in principle, is unacceptable. In principle, a mandate and
guardianship are unacceptable.
As for the consequences you asked
about, if such a scenario were to occur, they would certainly be
serious. This would not be a confrontation with Hamas alone; it would be
a confrontation with [Palestinian] society. I have said that any
non-Palestinian authority—meaning foreign authorities or foreign forces
inside Gaza—would be treated by Palestinians as an occupying authority,
as an occupying power. This would automatically create a state of
conflict because Palestinians would not accept it. Why would
Palestinians reject Israeli occupation but accept another form of
foreign occupation? That is unacceptable.
That is why I said that
the Palestinian people are the ones who govern themselves, who make
their own decisions, and who manage [their affairs]. Then Hamas took a
step meant to shorten the path: it stepped away from
administration—actually relinquished governance, not just in slogans—and
left it to mediators such as Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey, in a Palestinian
dialogue with various factions, to agree on forming a technocratic
administration. This is what we have done for more than a year. What
delayed this [process] is that the [Palestinian] Authority in Ramallah
was not enthusiastic about it, even though we said that the reference
authority of this administration would be the authority of Ramallah so
that the Palestinian system between Gaza and the West Bank could be
unified. Unfortunately, it stalled. Three weeks ago, this idea was
finalized: 40 respectable Palestinian figures, all independent
technocrats, were proposed, and eight were selected. The original plan
was for this step to be implemented quickly and efficiently, but there
was a delay because everyone was waiting to see what Israel would do in
the second phase and whether the United States would force Israel to
enter that second phase. President Trump’s recent statements indicate
that the process would begin early next year, but Israel is the one
causing the delay.
For your information and for the information of
American viewers and followers, the first phase has not met its
requirements. Israel has violated the requirements or conditions of the
first phase: in relief, shelter, the entry of tents and caravans, food
and medical aid, hospital rehabilitation, and opening the Rafah crossing
in both directions—as stipulated in the Trump plan and the Security
Council resolution. Yet Israel only mentions the remaining Israeli
bodies—only one left. Hamas and the Palestinian resistance committed to
everything, while Israel violated many [obligations]. This is in
addition to killings under various pretexts. Even the issue of Hamas
fighters in Rafah was a solvable problem, and the U.S. offered an
initiative, but it was thwarted by Netanyahu. We also heard how Trump
criticized Netanyahu, saying, “Why did you make this an ongoing crisis?”
Furthermore,
the “yellow line,” which initially allowed Israel to control about 53%
of Gaza—[Israel] is moving this line—has now shifted closer to 60% of
the Gaza Strip. So some in the world think the first phase was excellent
or fully implemented—it was not. While the war, in terms of total
annihilation, has stopped, Israeli violations continue. Therefore, our
call as Palestinians, not just Hamas, is that Israel must be held
accountable for all agreements of the first phase before moving quickly
to the second phase. As Hamas committed to the first phase requirements,
Hamas, along with all Palestinian forces, is committed to the
requirements of the second phase through this serious dialogue with the
mediators to reach sound approaches—not as Netanyahu wants, but as
agreed upon with the mediators. And I believe that the American side, as
I said, in its pursuit of stability and its concern for results more
than the ways Israel is trying to incite the U.S.—the American
administration and the international community will understand the
approaches that we can develop together with the mediators.
Jeremy Scahill: How,
though, are you going to navigate the role of Mahmoud Abbas and the
Palestinian Authority? He’s 90 years old. The last time he was elected
was 2005. The Palestinian Authority was established in 1994 with a five
year mandate. The Americans also punished Abbas—they banned him from
attending the United Nations general assembly in New York. But also they
want to use him for a sort of legitimacy stamp to say, “Ah, see,
Palestinians agree with this.” Recently Abbas pushed a decree law about
elections—the local elections—that would mean Hamas can’t run in the
election. Even Dr. Mustafa Barghouti, a Palestinian political leader and
former candidate for president who does not control any armed faction,
could not run in the election. But other resistance leaders have told me
that working with the PA right now in Gaza is the least bad option
because at least it’s Palestinian. But, given the history, this may not
really strike a lot of Palestinians as a convincing answer. What is your
position on how to navigate the way the Americans want to use the PA
and the broader struggle by Hamas and other movements to preserve the
Palestinian cause for an independent state?
Khaled Meshaal: First,
democracy is a right of the Palestinian people. Elections and building
the Palestinian political system on democratic foundations are a right
of the Palestinian people, not a favor from anyone in the world—not a
gift we wait for from anyone. On the other hand, the slogans raised by
the United States and Western capitals about democratizing the region,
or their support for a democratic system—they do practice it in their
own countries, no doubt about that—they must respect the choice of
peoples to exercise this democratic right. The Palestinian people have a
culture and a history of political engagement. Just as they excelled in
the struggle, they excel in politics. They have formed parties since
the days of the British Mandate. They have culture, free press,
education, and universities. The Palestinian people are vibrant,
educated, and well-versed in civilization. Palestine itself is the land
of civilization and of the Prophets—it has a long history. It also has a
history of peaceful coexistence among its different components and
religious communities. Therefore, the Palestinian people do not need
anyone to teach them the culture of democracy. They simply need others
not to interfere with or violate this right of democracy.
The
democracy desired in Palestine, as is unfortunately practiced in some
countries in the region and the world, is that elections should produce
predetermined results acceptable to those holding them. If they do not,
they are canceled. That is not democracy.
Now, there was the
Palestinian Authority, as you mentioned, [established] in 1994. In
2006, elections were held, and Hamas participated for the first time.
Hamas won the elections and formed a government in 2006 and extended
offers to all Palestinian partners. However, the Authority in Ramallah
pressured these factions not to participate. Consequently, Hamas was
forced to form the government alone with some independent figures. This
was not their choice but imposed on them because Ramallah incited the
participating factions. Until clashes occurred and some members of the
Palestinian security apparatus at that time attempted a coup against the
legitimate government led by Mr. Ismail Haniyeh—Brother Abu Al-Ubid was
the Prime Minister at the time, who later became a martyr, as you know,
more than a year ago. Then the Mecca Agreement of February 2007 was
reached, leading to a national unity government in which Fatah and all
the factions participated.
By June 2007, as a result of an attempt
by remnants of the security apparatus to overthrow this government,
clashes occurred, and stability was imposed in Gaza under the leadership
of Hamas. Some claimed that Hamas had ousted the others, which is not
true. I visited an Arab leader at the time, and he asked me, “Brother
Abu al-Waleed, how is it that you fought Fatah and the others in 2007?” I
replied, “We did not fight anyone. We were not opposing or fighting the
authority—we were the authority. When someone rebels against the law
and the authority, what should we do? Suppose, Mr. President, someone
from a party in your own country came and fought you—what would you do?
Retaliate? Stop them? Or just watch and smile?” The president smiled.
So, Hamas did not stage a coup against anyone because it was the
authority. Ismail Haniyeh [of Hamas] was the Prime Minister of the
national unity government, and [Fatah politician] Azzam al-Ahmad was his
deputy.
So, Hamas is committed to democracy, committed to
the law, and committed to making the democratic experiment succeed.
Since that time, the situation has changed. What is the main reason for
this? Many Western powers—and unfortunately, some regional powers in the
area—were not satisfied with the results of the 2006 elections and did
not give Hamas and the Palestinian society the opportunity to make this
experiment succeed. As a result, a coup was attempted against it through
security and military conspiracies. Vanity Fair at the time published a
detailed report
about this—it is a Western magazine, as you know. Gaza was also
subjected to an economic blockade. The democratic experiment was
therefore fought against economically and targeted security-wise through
attempts to overthrow it. The security coup did not succeed, but there
is no doubt that the blockade harmed the experiment and made life in
Gaza abnormal. So, this democratic experiment was perhaps targeted for
failure from the very beginning, but the will of our people enabled
Hamas to continue.
After that, we were called to hold
elections several times, but what made this fail was President Mahmoud
Abbas. We agreed several times—for example, in 2011, we agreed to
rebuild the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) on new democratic
foundations. That is, there are elections for the Palestinian
Authority—which, as you know, operates in Gaza and the West Bank. The
PLO is the political national reference for the Palestinian people,
inside and outside [the country]. We agreed to rebuild the organization
and took a transitional step by forming a temporary leadership
framework, which met for only two sessions in Cairo that I attended, and
then they did nothing. President Mahmoud Abbas, on his own initiative,
called for municipal elections several times and then canceled them. We
agreed in, I think, 2020 or 2021, on elections—they were canceled again.
I asked one of the leaders in Ramallah, “Why were the elections
canceled?” Of course, this was unofficial, and he said, “In short,
because we are not confident in the results.”
Therefore, the
democracy desired in Palestine, as is unfortunately practiced in some
countries in the region and the world, is that elections should produce
predetermined results acceptable to those holding them. If they do not,
they are canceled. That is not democracy. If you respect the will of the
people, allow them to express it freely at the ballot box. Today,
everyone knows—even after the destruction in Gaza following two long
years of the crime of genocide committed by Israel—that the Palestinian
conscience, awareness, and, I believe, the Palestinian voter, if given
the opportunity, would vote for the resistance They know that the
resistance reflects their conscience and is a natural response to the
occupation, and that the real problem lies with the Israeli occupation.
Therefore, the Palestinian Authority has become weak because, on one
hand, it no longer renews its legitimacy before its people. Secondly, it
has been reduced to weak roles, especially security coordination with
Israel. It has essentially become just a stamp or signature required to
approve steps taken by the Israelis or the Americans. And you know—you,
being part of American and Western society—that the West does not
respect the weak, even if they are its followers. The world respects the
strong. Hamas is strong, credible, and open to dealing with the entire
world.
So today, notice in the Trump plan and the Security Council
resolution—they, of course, want to end Hamas while at the same time
rejecting any role for the Palestinian Authority (PA). Europeans
advocate for a role for the PA, but the U.S. administration does not
accept it, and Israel does not accept it. That is why we have called for
Palestinian national unity, so that we are strong together and can
impose our will on everyone. Hamas believes in organizing the
Palestinian system around two principles: elections and a return to the
ballot box, and second, partnership, meaning we do not exclude anyone. I
have said this: in normal circumstances, as in the West, the party that
wins the majority governs, and the rest are in the opposition or form a
shadow government. But in our country, we need the energy of everyone.
We hold elections, and after the elections we form a formula of national
partnership across all institutions of the Palestinian political system
to benefit from everyone’s efforts.
This is what Hamas proposes:
it does not assert itself solely based on its popularity or majority,
nor because it is the primary force on the ground. It seeks to include
everyone. Hamas wants democracy because Hamas is also part of
Palestinian society. It has political experience and a practical, civil
presence within its community in all its aspects.
Khaled
Meshaal, right, with Ismail Haniyeh at a rally to mark the 25th
anniversary of the founding of Hamas in Gaza on December 8, 2012. Photo:
MAHMUD HAMS/AFP via Getty Images.
Jeremy Scahill: In the most recent polls
I’ve read, Hamas is the number one most popular political party in
Palestine. You are the most popular candidate for president with the
exception of imprisoned leader Marwan Barghouti. But in terms of men who
are not in prison right now, you’re the leading candidate. It seems
like Europe and America do not want Hamas to be able to participate in
elections. Given the popularity of Hamas and your popularity as a
political leader according to some Palestinian polls, would you consider
running for either president or to be head of the government as prime
minister? And how would you do that if they make a law saying you can’t?
Khaled Meshaal: First
of all, our dear brother Marwan Barghouti—who is in prison, and whom we
hope will be released—we have fought for his release, as well as for
[the release of] Brother Ahmad Saadat, the Secretary General of the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. However, it is Israel
that remains intransigent. And I am not revealing a secret when I say
that some Palestinian parties were not enthusiastic about Marwan
Barghouti’s release from prison—his wife knows this. Hamas, for its
part, was keen, but due to Israeli intransigence and the lack of
sufficient American pressure on Israel during the recent negotiations,
we were unable to secure the release of Ahmad Saadat, Marwan Barghouti,
Abbas al‑Sayyed of Hamas, Ibrahim Hamed, Abdullah Barghouti, Hassan
Salameh, Arman, and many other Palestinian leaders. This is, of course,
deeply regrettable for us. But this reflects our commitment to all the
prisoners of our people—whether from Hamas, Fatah, or the Popular Front.
We
hope that Marwan will be released, that he will have the opportunity to
engage in national struggle and political work, and that he will be a
candidate—this is his natural right. Hamas also has the right to
nominate whomever it chooses, whether Khaled Meshaal or someone else.
That is a decision for the movement to make at the appropriate time.
Just as Hamas courageously participated in the 2006 elections, it is
capable of doing so again. However, the doors are closed—not only by
Israel and the U.S. administration, signaling that they would reject any
election results—but, unfortunately, also by the Authority in Ramallah,
which does not allow elections unless it can guarantee [the outcome].
They want elections that are carefully calibrated and whose results they
feel assured about.
We understand and firmly believe that there
is no solution—just as there is no solution to dealing with the
occupation except for it to leave our land, whether through resistance
or otherwise. Incidentally, in my meetings with regional leaders and
Western leaders, I have told them clearly: our demand as Palestinians is
the withdrawal of the occupation from Palestine.
Jeremy Scahill: Have you personally had any discussions—you, yourself—with EU leaders recently, with European leaders directly?
Khaled Meshaal: No,
we did meet with officials from the European Union, but not at the
level of heads of state within the EU—we met with ministers. For a
period, we were open—there was openness toward us from Norway and
Switzerland. We met with ministers from those countries. We met with
officials from countries, some of these meetings were public, and others
were private. Many of the meetings we held were private. We welcome any
such meetings.
The main point is this: I told one of these
leaders that the Palestinian people’s demand is very simple—the end of
the occupation. It is our natural right. Our people do not accept living
under occupation. How do we get rid of the occupation? There are two
options: either we resist it, which is our natural right under
international law, or others help us to get rid of it—just as the
Americans have helped in the past to remove occupiers from certain
countries. We said that we prefer the easier option. But as long as the
international community does not act fairly toward us—while the
Americans and Europeans have intervened in some cases, such as Kosovo,
Bosnia, elsewhere, and Iraq, and at a certain point lifted their support
from the apartheid regime in South Africa—to this day the international
community and its major powers have not intervened to do us justice or
to compel Israel to withdraw, at the very least in accordance with
international legitimacy resolutions, which the West respects, from the
West Bank and Gaza. They have not done so.
Therefore, when the
world fails to help you, you have no choice but to resist the occupier
until you force it to withdraw. History—Palestinian history and the
history of the region—shows that there has never been a case in which an
occupier withdrew from land without pressure. This was [true] during
the era of British, French, and Italian colonialism in the region, and
it has been [true] in our experience with the Israeli occupation since
1948. That is our demand in the context of resistance. In the political
realm as well, the solution we believe in is democracy—but on the
condition that it is genuine democracy, not one imposed on us in the
manner preferred by Israel or the United States, where the results are
predetermined. As the Palestinian people, we are capable of managing our
own political system, holding free and fair elections, and governing
ourselves. The outcome of such elections would be a strong, respected
Palestinian leadership that represents the Palestinian people in
managing both the struggle on the ground and the political battle.
How
do we get rid of the occupation? There are two options: either we
resist it, which is our natural right under international law, or others
help us to get rid of it—just as the Americans have helped in the past
to remove occupiers from certain countries. We said that we prefer the
easier option.
Jeremy Scahill: Part
of why I’m asking is because some European leaders and political
officers have suggested Hamas could reform itself and take a more
moderate position. And it seems like they understand that Hamas
represents a large percentage of the Palestinian people. But there’s
going to be a lot of pressure on you and other leaders to make
concessions to Western countries. And given your career spent in this
movement, I’m curious how you navigate this. Because Hamas has been
called terrorists and this is in the mind of so many leaders in the U.S.
and in Europe. But Hamas is also a popular movement. It’s also a
resistance movement. So, how do you navigate this? I’m sure European
leaders—the European leaders know you well. And so I’m wondering what
your position is, how you deal with this pressure while staying loyal to
the overarching principles of Hamas?
Khaled Meshaal: There
is no doubt that how you present yourself under an initial or
preemptive accusation—that you are a terrorist organization and that you
are judged by Israel’s standards for classifying groups—[is difficult].
If, however, the U.S. administration and Western capitals applied the
same Western standards to Hamas and the Palestinian resistance factions,
they would classify them as national liberation movements—just as, for
example, the Americans did 200 years ago, the French during World War
II, and as all the peoples of the world have done. I am certain of this.
Just like how they treated Mandela: once considered a terrorist and
then he became a great man to them, and indeed he was a great man. If
Western standards on democracy, human rights, and opposition to
occupation under international law were applied, the West in its various
capitals would see Hamas and the Palestinian resistance forces as
national liberation movements. Yasser Arafat was considered a terrorist
by them and later became a man of peace.
Unfortunately, one
of the problems with the U.S. administration is that it prioritizes
Israel’s interests more than the United States’ own interests. Even
Trump’s people—MAGA—came to realize that Israel is a burden on them,
restricting and harming U.S. interests. I am simply calling on the
American people and the U.S. administration to judge based on America’s
interests, not Israel’s. If they look at us even for a moment in a fair
and impartial way, they will see that the Palestinian people are
oppressed under occupation, and they have the right to resist—unless
America steps in and forces Israel to withdraw, in which case we would
thank America. But if they do not do so, then they should leave us to
resist.
Egyptian
President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, U.S. President Donald Trump, and Emir
of Qatar Sheikh Tamim ben Hamad al-Thani at the Gaza summit in Sharm
El-Sheikh on October 13, 2025. Photo: EVAN VUCCI/POOL/AFP via Getty
Images.
Now, what is the other standard
for Hamas? The philosophy of resistance is to liberate [one’s land],
which is consistent with international law and the historical Western
approach to occupiers. Regarding structure—the organizational framework
of any movement—what more could they ask of Hamas in terms of its
democratic structure? Hamas elects its president and leadership every
four years. Hamas is democratic to its core, perhaps more so than some
Western parties and forces. Money is not used in our [elections] as it
is in Western elections. Hamas is inherently democratic and accepts
democracy with others, as shown in the 2006 elections, municipal
elections, and university and union elections. Hamas practices
[democracy] and abides by the results. Hamas is also a movement rooted
in society and provides services to the Palestinian community. It has a
civil body—it is a resistance movement, not a [purely] military
organization. It is not a military group. It is a social movement that
engages with all segments of society and has established many
institutions, including universities and hospitals and other facilities
that serve the Palestinian community.
So, Hamas is a movement that
cannot be described as terrorist, because it is part of the fabric of
Palestinian society. Accordingly, it should be dealt with on that basis.
You can interview anyone who has met with Hamas’s leadership among
Western figures. As I mentioned to you, for example, President Carter
met with us. Some former U.S. ambassadors met with us through the Human
Dialogue initiative in Switzerland. Others have met with us as well. All
of them came away with impressions very different from the
stereotypical image they had before meeting Hamas’s leadership. They
discovered that Hamas’s leaders are open, democratic, and willing to
engage [in dialogue]. Yes, they defend their national project and their
right to independence and to ending the occupation, but they are also
politically open to everyone. Therefore, this unfair, stereotypical
labeling is exhausting and burdensome for us because it erects barriers
between us and others.
It is in the
interest of the United States and Western capitals to pursue positive
engagement with Hamas and with the Palestinian people, because we are
the future, and this occupation will become part of the past.
Let
me give you an example: Ahmad Al‑Sharaa, who was formerly known as
Al‑Jolani, was once accused by the Americans of being affiliated with
Al‑Qaeda or Al‑Nusra, and suddenly he became acceptable. We are pleased
that he is accepted, because in the end he is a son of Syria. He has an
experience that I cannot judge, but later he fought for Syria’s freedom
and led his people, together with the broader Syrian forces, to rid
themselves of tyranny. That is a Syrian matter and their right. Why does
the U.S. administration give Ahmad Al‑Sharaa this opportunity but does
not give it to Hamas and the Palestinian resistance forces? It does not
even give it today to [Palestinian Authority President] Mahmoud Abbas,
who is not accused of terrorism. There is a clear double standard. I
believe—and I have said this repeatedly, and I say it to you now through
your platform—that the Palestinian people will prevail and will rid
themselves of the occupation, and Israel’s fate will not be different
from that of the apartheid regime in South Africa. It is in the interest
of the United States and Western capitals to pursue positive engagement
with Hamas and with the Palestinian people, because we are the future,
and this occupation will become part of the past.
Jeremy Scahill: Regarding
Ahmed Al Sharaa, I must say, when he took power, the Israelis bombed
nearly all of the conventional military capacity of Syria. They are
pressuring him to sign a normalization agreement with Israel. The
Israelis have been able to occupy more and more Syrian territory. Yes,
it’s an interesting example because of his history with Al Qaeda and
Nusra. However, the demand in front of the Palestinians now from Europe
is a disarmed Palestinian state, demilitarized—no army, no weapons. This
is what they are saying—two state solution. On the other side is
Israel. It’s not just Netanyahu—a large percentage of Israelis clearly
want all of you gone or dead, as indicated by public polls. So you’re
facing a situation where the support for Palestinians is unprecedented,
huge support in the world. But the official demand from the chambers of
Western power is no guns, no army, no self defense—essentially, you must
always be under the fist of Israel. That’s also the emerging reality in
Syria. That’s what they’re doing to the Syrians. So it’s a difficult
situation you’re in.
Khaled Meshaal: That
is true. And why? What is the reason behind all these abnormal
situations? It is Israel. When the United States or Western capitals
deal with other countries, they may not be right or fair, but they
behave in a relatively reasonable manner—except in any case where Israel
is involved. At that point, the West and the United States lose sight
of themselves and align with Israel’s demands—demands of an occupier
seeking dominance over the region. That is our problem today.
In
Palestine, they first talk about a state. And I believe that, so far,
the issue of a state remains a slogan—there is no real seriousness. Yes,
a conference was held under the sponsorship of Saudi Arabia and France,
and 159 countries recognized the Palestinian state, but this still
remains at the level of symbolism. There has been no international will
formed to force Israel to withdraw so that a state can actually
exist—because there is no state without withdrawal. The Palestinian
Authority declared the state many years ago, but it is a state in the
air. We are not seeking psychological satisfaction from symbolic
statehood, we are seeking freedom, independence, to live without
occupation, and to build our state. Today, this opportunity is not
available to the Palestinians. If the world does not want to help us
achieve this, then it should allow us to resist and should not label our
resistance as terrorism.
Furthermore, what does it even mean—a
state without weapons? Of course, if a state is granted as a gift from
others—if that were even to happen—it would come with conditions, just
as conditions were imposed on the [Palestinian] Authority. The problem
is that any achievement based on agreements under others’ conditions,
will restrict you. That is why the Palestinian Authority has been
constrained security-wise, politically, and economically. We are seeking
a Palestinian authority—or more precisely, a Palestinian state—after
the end of the occupation. We were not satisfied with having an
authority under occupation through Oslo. It proved to be a failed
authority because it was constrained, and at any moment [Israel] could
intervene. Today there is a complete violation of the Authority: the
Israeli army can enter Ramallah and Area A at any time, and it now seeks
to restore administration even over Area B, contrary to Oslo, and may
even reassert control over Area A as well. [Israel] intervenes whenever
it wishes. Any Palestinian minister within the Authority is stopped at
checkpoints—even Mahmoud Abbas cannot move without their permission.
What kind of authority is this? It is an authority without sovereignty,
without even the most basic level of respect or independent
decision-making.
Therefore, for us, the proper course is that a
state should be established only after the occupation ends. The first
step toward statehood is not available here. That is why the Palestinian
people do not wait for others. They know that the West—led by the
United States—acts with absolute bias whenever Israel is part of the
picture. Therefore, we decide to rid ourselves of the occupation and to
create our independence just as other peoples have done. Second, why am I
being asked to be disarmed? Guaranteed by whom? Who gives anyone the
right to demand a state without [weapons]? A state itself decides—just
as some countries choose to be non-aligned or without military
capabilities. That is their decision, it is not imposed on them. We are
like any other country in the world: we end the occupation, establish
our state, build it democratically, and it will have its own army like
any other state in the world. In short, there is a huge difference
between waiting for others to deliver your national rights and
demands—which I consider futile and detached from reality—and taking it
upon yourself to achieve your identity, your rights, and your national
aspirations. When you do that, those who reject you today will accept
you tomorrow. We know the Western world well: it tries to block you, but
once you prove your merit, it will deal with you. This is what we are
striving for.
We say to the American people—over the past two
years—we have deeply appreciated the engagement we have seen in American
society: in universities, [including] the most prestigious ones, across
different U.S. cities, among American elites, and among the new
generation of Americans, including Jewish Americans who have shown
solidarity with Palestine. Fifty-one percent of young Americans aged 18
to 24 support the Palestinian cause—indeed, support Hamas and the
resistance. [Note: The poll, conducted by Harvard/Harris in December
2023, asked if the October 7 attacks “can be justified by the grievances
of Palestinians?”] This is a significant shift, and we hope that the
American human conscience will awaken and realize that Israel is a
burden on [the United States], and that the Palestinian people are not
against American interests. We are opposed to those who interfere in our
affairs and to those who support our enemy. But we are ready to open up
to America, to Europe, and to the world to build cultural and
civilizational exchange, just as this region has historically been a
cradle of civilizations, and to manage mutual interests. What we will
not accept is occupation, guardianship, or support for an occupier. We
criticize the United States not because it is the United States—no—but
because it provides Israel, our occupier, with complete support in all
forms. Today, there is an opportunity for transformation, and I believe
it is in the interest of the West to sponsor a fundamental change in
[the approach to] Palestine, just as it eventually recognized the truth
in South Africa and withdrew its support from that apartheid regime.
Jeremy Scahill: Trump
of course is a businessman. And he’s not just representing America as
the president, he’s also preparing the path for business deals for his
family. Many Arab countries are making big deals with Trump and they are
trying to become very close friends of Trump. And in this deal on
Gaza—the 20 point plan—Arab countries and Islamic countries put their
stamp on it. And I heard you on Al Jazeera give credit to some of these
countries—they stopped the big genocide by agreeing to it, but still
Palestinians are killed every day. How do you not feel that this is one
of the biggest betrayals of the Palestinian people by Arab and Islamic
countries by working with Trump in this way?
Khaled Meshaal: Look,
as Palestinians, we deal with our Arab and Islamic nation on two
levels: one based on brotherhood—on the fact that we are one nation with
a shared destiny and mutual rights—and another based on the realities
of politics. As a leader, I have to balance both. Measured by the
standard of brotherhood and shared destiny—that we are one nation and
that the Palestinian cause has always been, and remains, the central
cause of the [Arab and Islamic] nation—there is no doubt that the
responsibility of the nation is great. Governments, leaders, and rulers
within the nation should not have allowed this criminal war, this war of
total genocide, to continue for two full years. That is why we called
on many leaders of the nation, from the very first weeks and months, to
move decisively and tell the Americans and the West: enough—this war
must stop. There was undoubtedly some shortcoming, and the efforts fell
short of what we had hoped for.
At the same time, we are
aware of Arab and Islamic weakness. We know that the Arab position is
not unified—there are disagreements, unfortunately, that have grown over
a long period. There is no agreed-upon Arab or Islamic leadership that
can command, reject, and coordinate collective action—there is
fragmentation and disarray. Moreover, many states are preoccupied with
their own priorities and interests with the United States and Europe. So
while they try to play a role in supporting the Palestinian people,
standing by its cause or stopping the war, they also [consider] economic
interests, arms purchases and other strategic considerations. And since
the American president is, in fact, a businessman, some countries are
trying to build relationships with him that either serve their interests
or protect them from potential harm, because they fear Trump’s
adventures and sudden moves, as we saw in the past.
This situation
undoubtedly weakens strong Arab and Islamic intervention to stop the
war, and it is something we have criticized. But this does not negate
the positive steps I mentioned in the interview—and I was sincere about
them. For example, Egypt’s rejection of the displacement of our people
from Gaza is a genuine Egyptian position because it also aligns with
Egypt’s interest and its national security. Similarly, Jordan has
feared—and continues to fear—the policies of Netanyahu, Ben-Gvir, and
Smotrich aimed at annexing the West Bank, displacing its population,
expanding settlements, destruction, seizing large areas of land, and
violating Al-Aqsa Mosque, over which Jordan has a religious
custodianship. These [policies] alarm Jordan deeply. Therefore, Jordan’s
rejection of displacement from the West Bank is also a genuine
position—it is not only about Jordanian security, but about the very
existence of the Jordanian state. There are concerns for the future. We
appreciate the positions taken by Egypt and Jordan. We also appreciate
the significant positions taken by Qatar, despite the fact that it is
not a neighboring country and is distant—it took strong and commendable
positions. The same is true of Turkey. And many Arab countries as well,
including Saudi Arabia, which was asked to normalize relations with
Israel, establish ties and join the Abraham Accords. [Saudi Arabia] set
four conditions: three related to Saudi Arabia, and one tied to ending
the occupation and establishing a Palestinian state.
There are
Arab and Islamic positions that I do not want to constrain [to a
list]—across our region there have been commendable stances. However,
they have not been sufficient given the responsibility of the [Arab and
Islamic] nation toward Palestine and in light of the scale of the crime
committed over two full years in the Gaza Strip. Our policy in Hamas is
to thank the efforts that have been made, while [at the same time]
calling for more. Even countries that supported us, such as Iran, and
Hezbollah, which entered the confrontation in support of Gaza, are
appreciated by us. There have been political efforts, military efforts,
humanitarian relief and support inside Palestine, and popular
mobilization in the Arab and Islamic streets, just as there has been in
Western societies—all of this is valued. But did the international
community succeed? Did the Arab and Islamic nation and its leadership
succeed in stopping the crime at an early stage? The answer is no, they
did not. The massacre and the war of genocide continued for two full
years. That was undoubtedly extremely painful for us—yet, praise be to
God.
When eight Arab and Islamic leaders went recently to New York
last September and exerted pressure on the administration—they met with
President Trump. This led to what became known as the Trump plan which
was not sufficiently fair and contained serious gaps, but we considered
it an important step toward stopping the war. That is why we dealt with
it positively, intelligently, and with flexibility, which helped bring
the war to a halt. Even this plan, however, is being violated by Israel.
From time to time, we hear statements from President Trump and some
members of his administration criticizing Israel, but the criticism is
mild. Meanwhile, Hamas—which has adhered to the agreement—continues to
face accusations and harsh rhetoric from time to time. This is something
that must be overcome.
In short, on this point: yes, more is
required from Arabs and Muslims, but they are not the strongest party.
As you know, no one in the world is able to compel Israel—even Europeans
do not do so, or cannot do so. Therefore, the responsibility of the
United States is a doubled responsibility, and power is responsibility.
President Trump and the American administration alone are capable of
compelling Israel and Netanyahu to respect the agreements, so they bear
this responsibility before we assign responsibility to any regional or
international party.
Yahya
Sinwar and Ismail Haniyeh watch a video feed in Gaza of the speech by
Khaled Meshaal announcing the revised political platform of Hamas on May
1, 2017. Photo: MAHMUD HAMS/AFP via Getty Images.
Jeremy Scahill: Hamas,
in essence, updated its charter in 2017 and the official position on
what the international community, particularly the U.S. and EU, calls
the “two state solution” is that Hamas, if it’s the democratic will of
the Palestinian people to establish a state along the pre-1967 war
borders, would not object to it and would accept the democratic will of
the Palestinian people. But you have an expansion of settlers in the
West Bank. You have a genocidal mentality in Israeli society. Is there
really a point anymore to Palestinians discussing a two state solution?
Is there any relevance to this anymore in your view?
Khaled Meshaal: Look,
what we announced in 2017 in the political charter was not, at that
moment, a new position regarding Hamas’s behavior or political
stances—Hamas had already developed and maintained these political
positions since it participated in elections, even before that. For more
than twenty-five years, Hamas has built a political philosophy and a
system of political positions and ideas, developing them through its
internal democratic structure, through dialogues with other Palestinian
factions, and also with Arab and Islamic countries through discussions.
This was to form a political program that aligns with its principles and
constants, but also opens horizons to achieve gains on one hand, and
importantly, provides a common ground for Palestinian-Palestinian unity
and engagement with the official Arab position.
We
wanted—especially after winning the elections—to create a joint
political program where we could meet with Fatah and other factions, and
also have a program with shared points with the official Arab stance,
as a way to facilitate matters. But we understood that Israel would not
allow this. What is called the “two-state solution” will not be
permitted [by Israel]. I believe that the idea of a two-state solution
is a beautiful slogan presented internationally and regionally, but
Israel will not allow it because the West Bank is, for Israel, the heart
of the Zionist project. Israel has historically referred to it as Judea
and Samaria.
What happened in Gaza in 2005, with the Israeli
withdrawal, was an exception forced upon Sharon at the time because Gaza
had become a burden for them. Gaza is a limited area, and Israeli
policy is fine with relinquishing small areas, especially if they have a
dense population and pose a security headache, like Gaza. The 2000
Intifada, though primarily in the West Bank in terms of population and
area, was addressed by Israel through withdrawal from Gaza, not the West
Bank. On the contrary, they launched [Operation] Defensive Shield.
Because the West Bank, in Israel’s plan, is the heart of the Zionist
project. That’s why I said: when Israel withdraws from the West Bank and
Jerusalem, it would mean a shift in the balance of power, and Israel
would withdraw from all of Palestine—it would leave all of Palestine.
So
why did Hamas accept a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders, without
calling it a two-state solution? Because the two-state solution implies
automatically recognizing Israel. In discussions with Westerners, we
told them: no, we accept a state on the 1967 borders as a shared
national project with the other Palestinian factions. As for recognizing
Israel, Hamas has a [clear] position on this—we do not recognize
Israel. However, we will respect the Palestinian will when it is
consulted on this matter and other related issues. As for us in Hamas,
we do not recognize the legitimacy of the occupation. So, why did we go
with the idea of a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders? To reach a
common position with our Palestinian partners and also with the Arab and
Islamic countries. Hamas’s approach has been proven correct—not only
what Hamas presented in 2017, but even back in 2006 in the National
Accord Document that came from the prisoners’ initiative. All of this
was on the table—a state along the 1967 borders. However, even the
official Arab system, which presented King Abdullah’s initiative—may God
have mercy on him—through the Beirut Summit in 2002, has not been able,
over these past 23 years, to achieve a single step toward establishing a
Palestinian state, because Israel refuses it. Israel will not give
anything freely.
For Hamas, therefore, we are both principled and
realistic. Principled: we reject the occupation, we reject guardianship,
we reject relinquishing our rights to the land and to Jerusalem, the
right of return for refugees, and the independence of our national
decision-making. These are the principles and rights of our people,
including the release of our prisoners. At the same time, we are
politically realistic and deal with partners, including the Palestinian
Authority in Ramallah and Fatah. We are realistic in dealing with the
Arab and Islamic reality and the international community, and we are
ready to engage with any serious project to establish a Palestinian
state along the 1967 borders. Even though I realize, unfortunately, that
this is impossible because of Israeli policy, not just because of
today’s realities with settlers, or the policies of Ben Gvir and
Smotrich—this [only] reflects the essence of the strategy. The Likud has
a clear strategy: no Palestinian state between the river and the sea,
and if Palestinians want a state, they should go to Jordan. That is
their strategy. The difference between Netanyahu and Smotrich or Ben
Gvir is only in how they present the position. But Netanyahu does not
differ from them in essence—he does not recognize Palestinian rights.
Therefore,
the current reality in Gaza, the settlements, the violations, the
attempts at displacement, and the war crime of genocide in Gaza show
that Israel does not respect Palestinian rights and does not accept a
Palestinian state. Nevertheless, we Palestinians—in Hamas, along with
our partners on the Palestinian scene and our Arab and Islamic
countries—are ready, if there is serious regional and international
commitment, for Israel to be compelled to withdraw to the borders of
June 4, 1967, including Jerusalem, so that we can establish our
Palestinian state. If the conditions are met, Hamas will accept this and
act responsibly. We will build a real democratic Palestinian state—not
like Israel today, which claims democracy while violating it even
against its own citizens.
Unfortunately,
Trump hasn't the slightest interest in solving the tragic situation in
Gaza. His only interest, as always, is in how he can take advantage of
the situation to gain more money and personal power. His meddling is
sure to cause more suffering for the Palestinians.
Real
journalism - you know it when you see it. Thanks for this excellent
interview. I'm grateful. I have to say I agree mostly with what Meshaal
is saying. And from my perspective here in the US, Israel is indeed a
massive burden. In multiple ways Israel has been a corrupting weight
around our neck - financially, morally, socially and in terms of
national security - for decades. Add to this the farce which commands
that speaking out on Israeli-made disasters makes one "antisemtic". This
is a truly disgraceful tactic and is absolute bullshit.